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The book under review is the two volume Dynamics of the Language: Philosophy of 
The World of the Words. 
1
 As the sub-title suggests, the author’s claim that he is 
presenting for the first time a philosophy of the world of the words that is, the world 
of intelligible beings only and even so independently of intermingling metaphysical 
beings and our allegiances to them. In fact, this work is the third in the series of the 
author’s engagement with the philosophy of language and grammar. The other two 
being “The Central Problems of Bhartṛhari’s Philosophy” (2008) and “Language, 
Being and Cognition” (2012). Here we find the author developing his thoughts further 
as presented in his earlier writings. 
The author now terms his understanding of language philosophy as Cognitive 
Holism. The whole book is actually a detailed elaboration of this cognitive holism. 
Cognitive Holism is the theory of language, which believes that language is primarily 
an indivisible awareness/ cognition. It is a theory of autonomy of language, which 
resolves the dichotomies of language and reality or of language and meaning/thought 
by concentrating only on intelligible beings. The author devotes three separate 
chapters to these issues of Cognitive holism, Autonomy theory of language and 
Individuality thesis of language. For the author language is primarily awareness by 
nature, a cognitive being. The outer form of language is not the real language; it is 
only a ‘garb’. What the outer garbs of language manifest is the real language, which 
not only expresses itself its own nature but also its meaning non-differently. Thus 
unlike Western Representatives and essentialists who give primacy to meaning and 
conceive meaning as transcendental to language , the author here presents the theory 
which gives primacy to language and understands/conceives meaning as that it 
expresses non-differently. 
Scholars have presented Bhartṛhari’s theory of language as metaphysics of 
language. For the author metaphysics is the last concern of Bhartṛhari and his 
grammarian tradition. The author here comes with his cognitive approach. For him 
language is ultimately cognition or awareness. Hence, a philosopher’s and specifically 
a language philosopher’s project is cognitive par excellence. Language operates only 
in the realm of the world of words. This is the only world where a philosopher can 
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significantly and determinately express his cognition. Things in themselves remain 
out of reach to philosopher’s objects of reflection. That is why the author repeatedly 
says “the book analyses and interprets cognition as it is expressed by language. Our 
cognition, communication, and reflections are not only based on but are confined to 
the intelligible beings of language and meaning.” 
Introducing his thesis to the readers Tiwari observes, “Our cognition is confined 
only to intelligible beings or ideas of the language and the meaning non-differently 
expressed by language. In very precise, the same awareness/idea or the flashing of 
consciousness, from the point of view of expresser is language and from the point of 
view of expressed is the meaning; they are only beings or intelligible existences 
(sampratyayātmaka) that we can know. Language as idea or concept is existence; in 
contrast to external things as primary existence; it is intelligible existence (vol. I, p.  
),” Explaining further what this intelligible being is, Tiwari says that the being 
revealed in the mind is cognitive and communicable by nature. That which figures in 
mind are ideas; they are existents or being which can only be communicated through 
garbs. They are intelligible or thought-objects and are called secondary existence or 
being with small ‘b’ with contrast to the external things or Beings.  
Sphoṭa, and its meaning revealed by it, are intelligible beings to which our 
cognition, communication and philosophical reflections are not only based on but 
confined to as well. Now this distinction of intelligible being and primary being 
reminds one the distinction between ‘world of ideas’ and ‘world of things/facts’ , or 
the famous Kantian distinction of ‘phenomena’ and ‘noumena’. However, it is to be 
noticed it was Mahābhāṣyakāra who, for the first time, made the distinction between 
the external being (bāhya Sattā) and the intelligible being (Buddistha sattā). Now 
what is the ideal or intelligible reality has been called intelligible being or even 
‘philosophical being’ by Tiwari (vol. I. p. 50).  
Contrary to external being which is limited only to present, philosophical or 
intelligible being is the being or ‘ideas’ or ‘concepts’ which may be of existence as 
well as of non-existence, of the past as well as of the future. That is why this sattā 
(intelligible being) has been defined as bhūtbhaviṣyat sattā—a being existent as past 
and as future as well; it is bhāvābhāvasādhāraṇa—that is, it flashes positively as 
being and non-being as well. 
Amongst various levels of language, it is the Madhyamā which attracts utmost 
notice from Tiwari. This does not mean that he underestimates the significance of 
other levels of speech. Tiwari is of the opinion that vaikharī is the level of language 
which forms the subject matter of disciplines like phonetics and linguistics. Similarly, 
the Paśyantī is the level of language which may be very interesting for spiritualists 
and mystics. However, as far as philosophers are concerned, they are and should be 
interested to that level of language where it is concept, idea or thought. Madhyamā is 
the language as concept or thought. It is the real language, which is manifested by 
Vaikharī or articulate utterances. 
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Madhymā is the language as thought or intelligible being, the being revealed in 
the mind of speaker as well as of listeners. It figures in listeners after hearing to 
verbal-noises and in case of speakers’ when they tend to speak (antaḥ sannivesini 
śabda). Tiwari says that one cannot intend to speak if there is no incentive and 
Madhyamā śabda serves as the cause of incentive. It is the flash of the mind of 
speakers; being manifested by articulate sounds, it reveals itself and its meaning non-
differently. Thus, Madhyamā is a meaning revealing śabda (vol. I. p. 38). Concluding 
his remarks about Madhyamā and Vaikharī Tiwari says “what is understood by the 
word ‘idea or thought –object that concerns thinking and reflecting’ may be called 
Madhyamā Śabda and what is articulated through human speaking organs is called 
Vaikharī (vol.I.p.38)”. According to Tiwari Bhartṛhari conceives Madhyamā-Śabda as 
Sphoṭa (vol.I.p.38). 
It should be noted, that in Indian tradition four levels of speech have been 
generally accepted. These are — Parā, Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. However, 
Tiwari is of the opinion, and it is rightly so, that Bhartṛhari accepts only three of them 
— Paśyantī, Madhyamā and Vaikharī. Tiwari observes that the position of 
Madhyamā as Madhyamā (middle) can be justified only when three levels are 
accepted. He discusses this issue in length and concludes that Parā, beyond Paśyantī, 
cannot be distinguished as a separate level of speech (vol. I, p. 39). 
According to the holistic philosophy of grammarians, sentences are the real units 
of language. Language is primarily an awareness, a concept or thought. Therefore, 
what is actually communicated by language is a complete thought an indivisible 
whole. Sentences are these indivisible wholes. Vaiyākaraṇas are not Padavādins. 
They do not believe that it is the words which are primary units of language. Primary 
units of language are those by which complete sense is revealed, and since these are 
revealed by sentences, so they are the primary units.  
Tiwari writes “A śabda expresses a complete sense satiating further expectancy 
in the cognition of a complete meaning and for that the term vākya (sentence) is used. 
Manifested by garbs sentences reveal its own nature first from which meaning is 
revealed non-differently (vol. I. p. 151).” Tiwari has devoted a complete chapter in 
the book for the analysis of the concept of sentence. Here he discusses all the eight 
definitions of sentences given by Bhartṛhari and discusses each of them in length in 
the light of Puṇyarāja’s commentary. The last two definitions that the sentence is 
indivisible whole (ekonavayaḥ śabdaḥ) and the sentence is a sequenceless, intelligible 
being (budhyanusanhṛtivākyam) are accepted to grammarians. The first of these two 
holds that a sentence is an indivisible whole— a whole without parts. It is a complete 
unit of language, expressive of a unit of meaning that satiates further expectancy of 
completion of a sentential meaning.  
By illustrating Bhartṛhari’s analogy of a picture Tiwari explains the fact why 
complete meaning is not communicated by words or group of words, and it is one 
indivisible whole. Similarly Buddhi, in the definition ‘budhyanusanhṛtivākyam 
according to Tiwari, means flash of understanding in mind, and annusanhṛti denotes 
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s that a sentence is 
intelligible, sequenceless and meaning revealing unit and in this sense it is the same 
which is ‘vākyasphoṭa’. Tiwari writes that the two definitions of the sentence as 
“eko’nvayaḥ śabdaḥ” and “budhyanusanhṛti” are not different. They emphasize the 
basic character of sentence as an indivisible whole without parts. While the first one 
emphasizes the sentence is not a collection of independent words; the second one 
highlights the sentence as a sequenceless flash of consciousness. Actually, in 
Bhartṛhari’s philosophy Sphoṭa is defined as having both the characters, and hence 
according to these definitions Sphoṭa, the complete indivisible being, is the sentence, 
which is awareness by nature. Being flash, it is sequenceless. 
The sentence is not just a set of utterances, they in fact are only instruments in 
manifesting the intelligible sequenceless sentence. Manifested by them 
sentence/Sphoṭa reveals itself and its meaning non-differently. Thus by analyzing the 
nature of sentence Tiwari comes across a beautiful argument for Sphoṭa. He says 
“Accomplishment of cognition cannot be possible if Sphoṭa as revealing being is not 
accepted. As verbal noises are destroyed before causing cognition, the question arises, 
what will be the expresser of meaning? As there is no expressed (vācya) possible 
without an expresser (vācaka), and as the verbal noises are only instrumental in 
manifestation the Sphoṭa, how can the expressed be explain without an expresser? 
Sphoṭa as an expresser of an expressed cannot be denied.” (vol. I, p. 161) 
If the chapter six of the volume I is devoted to the elaboration of the nature of 
sentence, the chapter eight is dedicated to the analysis of sentential meaning. The 
sentence is the signifier (vācaka) which is essentially the nature of flash, the question 
arises what is the nature of the signified (vācya)? In answer to the above question 
Tiwari discusses various views presented by rival schools of Nyāya, Mīmānsā and 
Vedānta and finally comes to the conclusion that they fail to explain the holistic 
cognitive nature of meaning. Tiwari in this context gives a sound analysis of six-fold 
definitions of sentential meaning and finds the grammarian theory of pratibhā as the 
best. He says “Different from the views mentioned above a sentence for 
Vaiyākaraṇas, is an inner, indivisible and real unit of awareness in nature i.e.  
Sphoṭa and a sentential meaning is that it reveals non-differently that is pratibhā, 
Bhartṛhari uses the word ‘pratibhā’ for the sentential meaning, the flash of awareness 
expressed by Sphoṭa. Thus, Sphoṭa is the flash of language and the pratibhā is the 
same flash as meaning a clear and distinct flash. The indivisible flash is analyzed as 
the Sphoṭa, the expresser and as the pratibhā, the expressed and both are the objects 
of cognition,” (vol. I, p. 192). Tiwari’s approach to the analysis or pratibhā differs 
from other ancient and contemporary scholars in the respect that he is least interested 
in the concept of pratibhā as religions experience, as poetic-imagination, as element 
of creative-poetic power, as intuitive faculty, as yogic prajňā or as mystical 
experiences or intuition. Being a philosopher of language, he is interested in it only as 
meaning directly revealed by Sphoṭa 
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Tiwari’s analysis of the concept of pratibhā compliments his cognitive and 
holistic understanding of language. Meaning revealed by sentence is not alien to it 
either in existence or in nature. Meaning is not external to language. Sentence and 
sentential meaning both are non-different and are of the same nature – the flash. 
Pratibhā as meaning of sentence is cognition or awareness and as such non-different 
from Sphoṭa. It is only, from the sense of duality or analysis, that from the point of 
view of language (expresser), it is called an expresser (Sphoṭa), and from the point of 
view of meaning, it is called the expressed (Pratibhā). But, in both cases, it is the 
intelligible being that we know in a cognition. 
The author is very much critical of those who conceive of language and thought 
as separates. In fact, the whole book is a critique of metaphysical understanding of 
language, which takes meaning as transcendental to language. Those who share the 
views include non-grammarians Indians as well as the completely western series of 
scholars — the representationists and the referentialists. Meaning for the 
representationist thinkers is transcendental to language. This is one of the major 
drawbacks of contemporary philosophers of language. With them, the gap between 
language and thought or language and reality remains unabridged. Contrary to their 
view for the grammarians signifier and signified or language and thought/meaning are 
infused and non-different.  
Tiwari argues, that if language and thought are different and meaning is 
transcendental to language the analysis of language will not then be analysis of 
thought; it would be difficult to accept philosophy as system of analysis of language 
for clarification of thought, and, hence it will be an aimless game. If thought is taken 
not only as different but transcendental to language, how can the clarification of 
former by analysis of the latter be achieved? On the other hand, since Vaiyākaraṇas 
take language as thought/concept, this problem never arises within them. 
The author criticizes in detail the views of Frage, Wittgenstein, Ayer, Austin and 
others and finds their understanding of language is based on the presumption of the 
duality of reference and referent. Language is taken here as reference and meaning as 
referent. The drawback with this theory is that here meaning as referent becomes 
transcendental to language. Hence, language and thought or reference and referent are 
separate to such extent that the latter becomes such exterior to the former that no link 
can relate them. Language does not touch the meaning .It can hardly indicate the 
referent from outside and cannot make it known.  
Tiwari has advanced several arguments against the representationists’ theory 
(vol. I. pgs. 6-8, 89-95), 13
th
 chapter volume I. I will not go in detail here, though they 
deserve serious study by scholars of language. Problems with reference theory were 
realized by representationists themselves, and hence we later find Wittgeinsteinians 
talking about non-referential functions of language and incorporating use, context, 
convention, etc. in their discourses. Tiwari, though applauding such approaches, is of 
the firm view these are just ultra-virus elements and cannot help in arriving towards a 
proper theory of language. Two of the major objections of Tiwari against 
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contemporary philosophy of language must deserve our attention. One of these is that 
the contemporary theorist estimate language from the view of meaning which is 
transcendental and separate from language.  
Language is just a tool or vehicle of meaning for them. They place meaning in 
the center of their enquiries and give primacy to it. The other objection is even more 
foundational. It somehow also explains why the above-mentioned attitudes towards 
language do arise. Tiwari calls this the metaphysical understanding of language. 
“Language as references, designation, representation and like are examples of 
metaphysical understanding of language (p. 2).” Language here is a pointer to or an 
indicator to something ontic in nature. 
The whole of Tiwari’s project is based against these two basic understandings of 
language and meaning. Tiwari’s cognitive holism is a cognitive understanding of 
language in place of metaphysical rendering of it where primacy has been given to 
language itself in place of meaning. Meaning in a cognitive holism is what the 
language expresses; it is never found separate from language. According to this 
expressive or active theory of language, language is potency, an energy that can 
function in different forms and many ways as reference ,representation, designation 
and other illocutionary senses as well. In fact, language can express itself and its 
meaning in infinite ways.  
Logic of autonomy of language suggests that the meaning of language should not 
be something alien to it; rather it should be its own part only. Meaning flashes by 
language, it is not known independently of language rather language infuses it. It is 
what the language expresses and is cognized only when the language flashes it. The 
meaning is eternally infused by language, and that is why the analysis of meaning 
takes place by the analysis of language. Tiwari argues “to analyze language and to 
conceive ‘I analyze meaning’ is possible only when language that we analyze is taken 
to infuse meaning otherwise ,no cognitive activity will be possible ; doing activities 
through language and taking language as separate and transcendental to thought is a 
misconceived , misguided attempt causing unsolvable confusion(vol.I.p.94)”. 
Cognitive holism holds that what we know is the flashes of our mind. Moreover, 
what flashes in our mind is the language and its meaning. Thus, our cognition is 
confined to the world of words and its meaning. Compared to the world of external 
things, which are ontic in nature the word of language and its meaning is a world of 
ideas and thoughts, which Bhartṛhari calls buddistha-sattā and Professor Tiwari calls 
intelligible being. This intelligible being is secondary being which exists only as idea 
compared to the primary being, which is the being of thing in-themselves. This is the 
Mukhya-sattā or bāhya-sattā Tiwari empathetically asserts that as cognition is flash 
of language and always infused with it, intelligible being of language and meaning are 
only philosophical objects.  
All our knowledge, philosophical analysis and reflection are confined to this 
world of intelligible beings. As far as the world of primary being is concerned, as it is 
never in touch of language, it never became an object of our knowledge. This non-




cognitive world may be of interest and a place for day-to-day concern and activities 
for common people but this world has nothing to do with a philosopher’s concern. 
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Referring to the famous line of Helārāja “Vaiyākaraṇānām śabdārtho hyarthaḥ na 
vastvarthorthaḥ.” Tiwari says that for a philosopher of language meaning is what the 
language expresses and not the thing in-itself. Hence a philosopher’s concern is. and 
should be confined to. word of intelligible beings only: “A philosophical reflection 
has nothing to do with things or things in-themselves, whether they are eternal or 
transient.” “Kim na etena idam nityam idam anityam vā iti.” (vol. I, p. 71) 
The term cognitive holism may suggest readers that Tiwari is somehow giving 
primacy to cognitive aspect of mind as compared to other aspects like emotions and 
volitions. In fact, this is one of the major objections raised against Indian theories of 
language and consciousness. Moreover, this becomes more pertinent when we keep in 
our view that the world of language is the world of intellect (intelligible beings). 
Therefore, this prima facie suggests that the world of language is the world of 
intellect. If we go deeper, we find that what Tiwari is aiming/doing here is just 
presenting an epistemology of cognition of meaning of words. Meaning revealed to us 
is indivisible awareness that may include within it the cognitive, emotive, and 
volitional as the language expresses. In fact, Tiwari’s firm view is that language is 
primarily injunctive. Action/duty is the primary end for which the whole exercise of 
language is meant. That is why it should not sound contradictory when he claims that 
his cognitive holism is based on active theory of language.  
In fact, a whole chapter has been devoted to explicate the epistemology of actions 
and morals. Other contemporary scholars also are of the opinion that Bhartṛhari best 
explains beauty and Arts, thus, cognition in cognitive holism does not suggest any 
preference to rational aspect of intellect. It stands for awareness, a flash. Tiwari is 
conscious of this possible misunderstanding. That is why he in the very beginning 
makes clear that he is using the term ‘cognition’ in the sense of awareness or flash of 
consciousness which includes the flashing of the intelligible beings of emotional, 
volitional, intuitive and transcendental aspects of consciousness as well. 
This book is unique in the sense that it does talk about the spiritual goal of 
philosophy of language. Philosophy of language is a royal road to liberation. It is 
freedom from the captivity of some or the other things, theories and their allegiance. 
The problem lies in the fact that we stick to this or that ideology and our journey to 
freedom is imprisoned to that. Language expresses cognition without any dependency 
on things and our allegiance to them. Cognition as such thus, is a pure flash and 
disinterested. Interested knowledge emerges only when this pure and disinterested 
cognition is imposed on our passions, emotions, physiological, physiological, culture 
and religious things and our allegiance to them. We should concentrate on 
disinterested cognition and practice avoiding knowing by imposing. Philosophy 
differentiates what is distinctly, and determinedly, cognized by language and its 
imposition on emotions, passions and other allegiances. A true philosopher is one 
who knows discriminately what is revealed and what is imposed. 
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Language according to Vaiyākaraṇas is not confined to garbs or tokens of a 
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system or signs we utter, listen, write or read which stand by proxy for the expresser; 
they are only tools in the manifestation of the expresser that when manifested by 
them, flashes forth by its own nature from which its meaning flashes non-differently. 
Garbs manifest the concept, then manifested so the concept reveals itself which we 
call the flashing of consciousness. Thus both the verbal — noises (garbs) and the 
expresser (Sphoṭa) are involved in the accomplishment of communication and both 
taken jointly is called śabda. The former instruments the manifestation of Sphoṭa that 
reveals itself and its meaning non-differently.  
As Bhartṛhari’s verse ‘Dvā upādāna śabdeṣu śabdo śabda vidoviduḥ.Eko 
nimittam śabdānām aparārthe prayujyate (vākyapadīya 1/44)’ suggests a śabda in 
fact is a blend of the two – the meaning revealing ‘unit that is Sphoṭa’ and the verbal 
noises/ utterances that is dhavni . The former is of the nature of awareness and the 
latter is that of the material tool or instrument (that helps the manifestation of the 
former) in manifesting the forme, 
Sphoṭa form the point of view of speaker is the cause of production of dhvani and 
dhvani being produced by Sphoṭa is the cause of manifestation of Sphoṭa in the 
audience. From the point of view of the hearers, dhvani is the cause or Sphoṭa 
because it causes manifestation of Sphoṭa. Communication is neither a sheer activity 
of hearing nor that of uttering. It is not confined even to the act of uttering or hearing 
only, rather it is the accomplishment of cognition in which uttering and hearing serves 
as tool only. What is heard and uttered are articulate utterance (dhvani) which from 
the cognitive point of view is only the tool that invokes revelation of the intelligible 
being of language – Sphoṭa The conceptual/ intelligible level of language (Sphoṭa) is 
a cognitive unit and hence foundational to communication 
There are three factors involved in language according to the grammarians: 1. 
First there is articulate utterance or verbal — noise (dhvani) which manifests; 2. The 
Sphoṭa, the concept, the idea or thought, the intelligible being of language (the 
expresser) which expresses itself and 3. Its meaning (pratibhā), the expressed. 
Thus language involves three factors —Dhvani, Sphoṭa, and pratibhā. Dhvani is 
articulate sound, which manifests the Sphoṭa, the Sphoṭa is the meaning —revealing 
unit, the expresser or the signifier, and the pratibhā is the meaning, the signified, the 
expressed, the flash of understanding. 
The whole process of linguistic communication is this: first, there is flashing of 
concept in the mind of the speaker. An idea bursts forth in the mind of speaker. This 
causes incentive to speak and hence articulate utterances-verbal noises,-sounds 
(dhvani). These utterances are grasped by auditory sense of the hearer, and Sphoṭa is 
manifested in the mind of the hearer by hearing the utterances. (Manifested by 
utterances Sphoṭa reveals itself and its meaning non-differently). Revelation of 
Sphoṭa occurs in the mind of hearers, which reveals meaning non-differently. This 
causes incentive to do or not to do something or otherwise. 
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The book “Dynamics Of Language” is a set of two volumes each divided into 
systemically arranged twelve and sixteen chapters respectively .These volumes 
discuss at length the various dynamics of language in perspective of Indian 
grammarian philosophy. Against metaphysical understanding of language, the book 
provides a cognitive approach to language. The relation of language with meaning, 
thought and reality have been discussed in the book keeping “language” at the center. 
Basic philosophy presented in the book is that language is power and expressive. 
Based on this expressive theory of language, the book discusses philosophy of the 
cognition of the world of words.  
The author is of the firm view that our cognition, communication and reflections 
are not only based on but also confined to the intelligible beings of language and 
meaning. Throughout the book, the author aims towards working out a philosophy of 
language that is free from metaphysical, psychological, religious and other entities 
and our allegiance to them. After going through the book, one realizes that the author 
has been successful in his project. 
The book analyzes very minutely and discusses at length almost all popular 
theories of language and meaning. The meanings of words ,prefixes, suffixes and 
different theories of the word, the sentence, the word-meaning, the sentential meaning 
and the theories of verbal cognition have been discussed as according to the Indian 
grammarians taking serious account of the views and counter –arguments of the rival 
theories. The success of the book lies in the fact it discusses minutely some of the key 
problems of philosophy of language, specially Holistic understanding of language, 
Cognitive holism, Autonomy of language, Indivisibility thesis of language, Ontic 
non-being verses intelligible being, Language and possibility of disinterested 
knowledge, Language and logic of Translation and Analysis, Language and 
communication, Language and culture, meaning of moral expression, Problem of 
negation and Indescribable. The book explores these problems from contemporary 
perspective and in comparison with the Western counterparts as well. The exposition 
is full of arguments and counter arguments; the views and arguments of rival theories 
have been presented very honestly, and all this reminds one of argumentative style of 
ancient Indians. 
Volume first of the book provides a critique of almost all popular theories of 
language, meaning , relation between them and the controversy on verbal- cognition 
examined well in light of advancement of knowledge. The volume follows author’s 
reflection on the classical grammarian philosophy of India. It concludes in a way that 
culminates into a holistic philosophy of language. 
Volume second discusses and analyzes the dynamics of language from this 
holistic prospective of cognition. The author claims “attempt is made here for the first 
time to investigate into dynamics of language; the concepts that are concerned 
directly with flashes or knowledge and that too in a way the analysis of those 
concepts is the same analysis of knowledge. It facilitates us to understand indivisible 
knowledge through its different perspectives.” (vol. II. p. 5) The book successfully 
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keeps the promise of analyzing and interpreting the cognition by language afresh 
without any amalgamation of metaphysical, psychological, religious entities and our 
allegiance to them. 
The last three chapters of the vol. II of the book are devoted to the philosophies 
of Jainism, Buddhism and Cārvāka. Here special mention should be made on studies 
of language in the last chapter, which discusses Cārvāka theory of śabda. In fact, 
Tiwari provides an entirely different story of Cārvāka based on Jayarāśī’s 
Tattvopaplavasinhaḥ. Tiwari complains that school of Cārvāka is interpreted by 
modern scholars in the light of Mādhavācārya’ Sarvadarśanasaṃgrahaḥ. Though 
Jayarāśī is much earlier to Mādhavāchārya, the latter according to Tiwari had not 
gone through his Tattvopaplavasinhaḥ. Had he gone through it the story of Cārvāka 
would have been quite another. Tiwari here discusses in length the 14
th
 Chapter of 
Tattvopaplavasinah- śabdapramāṇasya nirāsaḥ, which is centered at the refutation of 
theories of verbal cognition. He presents the arguments of Jayarāśī one by one and 
evaluates it honestly.  
In fact, Tiwari’s exposition here may be viewed as a commentary of the referred 
chapter. Tiwari’s analysis of Jaina philosophy of language is also very significant one 
for this is one of the most neglected area of Jainism. Barring a few scholars like 
Sagarmal Jain, none has taken serious note of Jain Philosophy of language. The book 
under review not only discusses ancient classical scholars in this regard but also takes 
in consideration of Sargarmal Jain’s book. His view on Jain position examines the 
position of Jains regarding ‘indescribable’. Tiwari finds himself in total disagreement 
with it. He writes “Philosophically, the position of Jainas leads to a dichotomous 
situation. If indescribable (avācya) remains indescribable, how can it be described by 
the term indescribable (avācya)? Jainas may say that avācya is avācya only because it 
is the object of knowledge partially by experience and absolutely by Sadhanā” (vol. 
II. p. 239). In the chapter on the Meaning of Religious Ideas of Buddhism, the author 
starts his discussion with a brilliant account of the Buddhist notion of construction 
and verbal meaning. I fail to understand why he instead of delivering on those 
unnecessarily engages himself with the Buddhist notion of pāramitas and 
Daśabhūmis 
The language and arguments furnished in the defense of his thesis are quite 
simple and can be understood by any reader interested in the philosophy of language 
and grammar. The only drawback, which I find with the book, is that it is full of 
proof-mistakes. It appears as if no editorial effort has been made in this regard. The 
title of the chapter nine in the content of the second volume is missing. The font of 
these volumes is too small to be read. I hope all these would be taken in notice in 
future editions of the book. I congratulate the author for his thought–provoking 
discussion and reasoned arguments in the defense of his views that scales the 
contribution of the book to a philosophical height. 
A major strange point of cognitive holism of Prof. Tiwari is that it limits 
language to the world of intelligible beings. Philosophical reflections are confined to 




e world of words that is intelligible beings. Knowledge is expressed by and infused 
y language and the language does not touch the reality independently from 




intelligible beings. Things in - themselves remain beyond the grasp hence unknown. 
This situation may not be unwelcome to grammarians but for some philosophers it 
would be an embarrassing situation. It is true that a grammarian is and should be 
interested only to the world of words but as far as a philosopher and particularly a 
philosopher of language is concerned one of his major tasks is to explain the relation 
between language and the reality, language and things lying outside it. Tiwari has 
discussed the issue of intelligible being and primary being in such a way that what has 
been called otherwise a secondary being in Bhartṛhari’s philosophy becomes primary 
to Tiwari’s analysis when he says that a philosopher’s concern is and should be 
confined to only intelligible beings 
The reason why reality in Tiwari’s Cognitive holism remains philosophically 
interesting is that he overestimates the Western notion of ‘concept’, ‘thought’ and 
‘logos’. Throughout the book in the most of the places, he has identified the nature of 
language as ‘concept’ or ‘thought’. However, it would be injustice to Tiwari if we say 
that he is not aware of the consequences of Logocentricism. In fact, we find him 
repeatedly making a distinction between a ‘concept’ and a ‘flash of concept’, and 
identifying the Sphoṭa often with the second one, similarly he repeatedly tries to make 
a distinction between ‘proposition’ and ‘vākya-Sphoṭa’. It is clear to him that Sphoṭa 
is not an abstraction and ultimately it is a flash of awareness.  
The pit-falls of logocentric and representative theory of meaning have been 
discussed very scholarly by him in the book so many places. Likewise, efforts have 
been made brilliantly to overcome the duality of language and meaning or language 
and thought. We find him arguing the indivisible theory of language where meaning 
does not remain a transcendental signified; it is infused with language. Meaning and 
thought become integral to language, they no longer are separate or exterior to it .But 
nevertheless ,we find him so many places equating language with ‘concept’, ‘idea’, or 
‘logos’ and unnecessarily paying undue emphasis on intelligible being and excluding 
the primary being from his cognitive world. Had Tiwari advanced his argument of 
identifying language and meaning a little further, he would have found that ultimately 
reality is not transcendental to language. Language and reality are in tuned and 
infused with. They are not two, but one 
The value of language lies in expressing knowledge and that of knowledge in 
causing incentive to action. Cognitive holism is an action-oriented theory of language. 
The whole enterprise of language is here meant for action. Tiwari rejects out rightly 
the contemporary theories of moral language, which, hold moral language as 
meaningless. In the chapter eleven entitled ‘The Meaning of Moral Language: Indian 
Perspective’ of the Volume II of the book Tiwari examines the contemporary meta-
ethical theories of  the West and finds them unsound. In this context, he specially 
criticizes the theories provided in Language, Truth and Logic, Ethics and Language 
and the language of Morals. Against the non-cognitivists Tiwari holds that moral 
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judgment is cognitive and against logical positivists, he holds the theory that moral 
language is not only meaningful but also in some sense Verifiable.  
Tiwari remarks “a moral sentence, unlike the factual sentences that expresses 
facts, is expressive of duty, and is basically an object of evaluation and is verified by 
the duty performed on its basis.” (Vol. II, p. 200). This does not mean that Tiwari 
advocates the verification theory. In fact, he is too critical of representative theory of 
language. For him language is expressive and all sentences are expressive by nature. 
Factual, non-factual, descriptive, emotive, perspective, all expressions express- their 
respective meaning because of which we know them so distinctly by the respective 
sentences. A J. Ayer type meaningful—meaningless criteria of type Boolean true-
false criteria may be valuable for factual propositions, but as far as moral sentences 
are concerned, they are neither befitting nor applicable.  
The testability thesis totally fails. “Moral sentences are based on human conduct 
the performance of which is evidential for their value; their meaning is expressed by 
the sentences themselves and thus need not require verification based on the 
corresponding fact in the empirical world (Vol.II.p.206)”. As moral sentences are 
sentences related with duty and not with facts, Tiwari rejects the correspondence 
criterion in any of its forms. Hence, the theory of utilitarianism, or rather all sorts of 
consequentialists theories are also rejected because somehow or other they are based 
on the fact or correspondence. In way the author makes ‘duty’ in the center and the 
way he vehemently attacks the consequentialists he appears to be advocating the 
deontologist’s position. However, in some other place he openly favors for the virtue 
ethics 
Tiwari tries his best to provide a complete analysis of moral language as 
according to Indian theorists. In this regard, his attempt is commendable and unique. 
He advances a number of arguments to prove why language is primarily an action 
oriented. His arguments are justifiably agreeable. Being a Grammarian, he is able to 
show that action is the central meaning of the sentences. As we know according to 
Grammarians ‘verb’ is called ākhyāta that expresses an action without which 
communication cannot be accomplished by language. Use of mere nominal words 
cannot satiate the expectancy for a complete sense, whereas ‘verb’ conveys the 
complete sense. Hence, there is no sentence isolated from ‘verbs’ (eka tiň vākyam). It 
is not only that a ‘verb’ is sentence because the complete sense is expressed by it but 
also the use of nominal word alone, if verb is implied with it, is a sentence. Analyzing 
in length the nature of words, sentences, sentential division, stems, lakāras, suffixes 
Tiwari shows that Indian theorists as framed and formed keeping primacy or action or 
duty interpret words and sentences in view. Language as well as the world here is 
totally action oriented. Tiwari remarks, “…for the thesis presented herein, life is the 
constant process of action and the theorists give importance to duty to the extent that 
they provide subordinate importance to the sentences lacking some or the other duty.” 
They accept that all sorts of verbs are derived from verbs/ roots; recognize verbs as 
the central word and action as the central meaning of sentences. (Vol. II, p. 208) 
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Advancing his argument further for the meaningfulness of moral sentences 
Tiwari says that language expresses emotive, prescriptive and different meanings and 
its uses as reference, representation, designation and other ways on that basis, it 
performs several functions. With these differences, it is not philosophical to 
concentrate on any one out of its different sorts of functions, as the only meaningful 
function of the language, and this will be the overlooking of the cognition that is 
expressed. All expressions express their meanings and this is so with moral language 
too. Moral sentences are well distinguished by the ‘should/ought’ applications; it 
expresses its meaning non-differently.  
The knowledge expresses by them causes incentive to a duty and a conduct 
following them is evidential in valuation of their meaningfulness. If the conduct 
follows the incentive it is good, and if it deviates it is bad. The incentive contains 
three parts (i) the duty to be performed (Sādhya), (ii) means to that duty (Sādhana) 
and, (iii) application of the duty (Itikartavyatā), which collectively are called 
(bhāvanā) expression of duty. This bhāvanā is always for a duty of welfare and not 
for otherwise, and that is why it is called Dharma. Concluding his remarks Tiwari 
asks- “How can a sentence expressing an action comprising all the three parts of an 
action be meaningless?” (Vol. II, p. 208) 
Cognitive holism emerged in Tiwari’s discussions in the volumes under review is 
a trend of philosophy potential enough to be learnt for an updated and fresh insight 
into the problems of philosophy. I observe Tiwari’s interpretation on active theory of 
knowing, the infusion of language and cognition, concept of intelligible being, the 
problem of identical cognition, arguments against proposition as abstraction, 
autonomy of language, determinate versus indeterminate cognition, dichotomies of 
interested and disinterested, analytic and indivisible, verity and validity of cognition, 
difference between Being and being, between objects of cognition and cognition itself 
and controversy over language between the word-theorist’s and the sententialist’s, his 
argument of language oriented against meaning oriented philosophies are 
philosophically precise and consistent, attractive and outstanding.  
Arguments, discussions and evaluation of concepts undertaken in the book and 
his style of differing or agreeing with rival theories are commendable. The author’s 
perception of cognitive holistic interpretation and his claim that cognitive holistic 
approach to philosophical problems, I am sure will attract the philosophers in time to 
come. I hope the book is a great help to the intellectuals who are sick of the same 
taste of the scholarly books on history of Indian Philosophy describing the same 
issues in similar way without caring novelty and to those seeking some challenge in 
the field of philosophical reflection. I am sure scholars and students of philosophy, in 
general, and Philosophy of language will welcome the book globally, in particular. 
